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Abstract 
Discourses on lethal drone operations in the twenty-first century have commonly focused on 
the physical effects of drone strikes – usually by the CIA – on populations and individuals, 
and on associated disputes over the legitimacy of such actions. Until now, the secrecy 
surrounding drone programmes has excluded the perspective of serving military drone 
operators from public and academic debate. Drawing on both public discourse and 
interviews with Royal Air Force Reaper drone personnel, this paper explores two ways in 
which the identity of the drone operator is formed and self-created. Identity formed through 
other-representation in public discourse is contrasted with elements of identity as practice in 
the operators’ own discourse. Foucault identified the objectivizing of the subject as a means 
by which an individual’s identity is constituted in discourse, while also highlighting 
technologies of the self that are used when the individual’s identity is self-created (Foucault 
and Rabinow 1997: 224-5). Further, Foucault’s self-forming ethical subject emerges in two 
ontologically distinct but entwined trajectories: first, in relation to socially or culturally 
accepted rules, laws, prohibitions and interdictions, which he calls the moral code; and 
second, through practices of the self (1984: 5, 25). Drawing on Foucault, this paper provides 
new insight into the actions and identities of British Reaper drone operators, recognizing the 
previously-unseen, complex and creative ethical dynamics at work in individuals who 
routinely take decisions and actions that have life or death consequences.  
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1.  Introduction 
This article makes a distinct contribution to this special journal edition on 
interdisciplinary approaches to the study of identity by examining how the 
identity of the drone operator has emerged in twenty-first century drone 
discourses. From newspaper headlines to anti-war activism, the term ‘drone’ 
has become ubiquitous in conventional and social media, as well as in official 
reports, newspapers and popular literature of the kind addressed in this 
paper. These discourses often imply that drones are independent robotic 
killing machines beyond the control of human beings and the constraints of 
law and personal ethics (Callam 2010; Williams 2010; Sauer and Schörnig 
2012; Baggiarini 2015). Drone-based social imaginaries informed by science 
fiction, dystopian fantasy and apocalyptic anxiety are presented as a major 
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and ominous reality. Further, Wall and Monahan (2011: 246) argue, ‘[d]rone 
systems necessarily objectify, and most likely dehumanize, people targeted by 
them’.  
The identity of the ever present, ever absent drone operator has been obscured 
as the first governments to use remote delivery of lethal air power – the US, 
UK and Israel – have all prioritised political, operational and technological 
secrecy above openness and transparency (Singer 2011; Benjamin 2012; 
Woods 2015; Knowles and Watson 2017). With limited or no access to the 
programmes concerned, scholars and popular commentators alike have 
postulated apparently incompatible outcomes and consequences despite 
drawing on the same drone characteristics and applications, while still 
unifying around critique of government policy and military activities. For 
example, Benjamin (2012) writes of the Afghan who is smoking, meeting 
friends, going to the bathroom ‘never imagining that anyone is watching him’. 
Meanwhile Baggiarini (2015: 130) refers to ‘the distanced, permanent and 
panoptic gaze(s) of drones’, which relies on the subject being aware that (s)he 
is being watched. Elsewhere, and relying on similar evidence, Williams (2015) 
uses the phrase ‘distant intimacy’ to articulate the counterintuitive dimension 
of developing personal familiarity with a potential target on the part of the 
operator, despite the vast geographical separation involved.  
The methodology used in this paper is drawn from Foucault, who locates the 
forming and self-forming of subjectivity in discourse (Foucault and Rabinow 
1997: 224-5), to support critical engagement with the emergence of drone 
operator identity in two distinct ways. The first focuses on the identity of the 
drone operator as it has emerged through other-representation in public 
discourse: in newspaper and online media, as well as in official reports. In this 
domain, the drone operator is distant – absent even – and represented in 
discourse as a particular kind of, usually unethical, subject. The second 
examines self-created identity in the operators’ discourse as it relates to their 
practices. This second domain of analysis is the extensive field research I 
conducted with drone operators from the UK’s Royal Air Force Reaper drone 
community; the data collection includes 80 interviews and 25 written 
responses which address personal ethics and ethos in day-to-day practices. 
Two sets of data are used in these two contrasting approaches to drone 
operator identity – textual discourse in newspaper, media and official reports, 
and the empiricist discourse of collated drone operator interviews. 
Epistemologically they appear – are – inconsistent. They approach the drone 
operator through distinct lenses and, as author, I complicate the matter 
further with my own selection of discourse to analyse. However, this paper 
seeks to illustrate how identity is produced, rather than provide exhaustive 
conclusions about who the drone operator ‘really is’. Consequently, a key 
assumption that runs through the discussion below is that drone operator 
identity is created and not just described in the different discourses. 
The article proceeds by setting out the conceptual framework that will shape 
subsequent discussion. Two specific Foucauldian ideas will be used. First, 
there is Foucault’s conception of discourse and how it operates in different 
domains (Foucault and 1997d: 225). The second element of the framework 
draws on Foucault’s (1997a: 224-5) reflections on the means by which people 
are made known as subjects, or come to know themselves as subjects. The 
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second section will focus on how the drone operators’ identity is constituted in 
relation to killing; in particular the extent to which (s)he conforms to codified 
morality in terms of rules and laws. The third section will provide a 
contrasting perspective by examining the personal discourse of British Reaper 
drone operators, identifying the means by which they come to see themselves 
as ethical subjects in their day-to-day drone operational practices, which 
includes conforming to UK military law and rules of engagement (ROE).1 The 
paper will conclude by reflecting on the differences between these approaches 
and how they contribute to a more holistic understanding of the issues and 
challenges involved in the use of lethal drones. 
2.  Foucault, Discourse and Subjectivity 
The use of discursive approaches in the field of International Relations (IR) 
can be found in a burgeoning literature. Milliken (1999: 233) sees discourses 
as ‘social signs of signification’ and cautions against conducting overly narrow 
discourse analysis on single texts, preferring ‘a set of texts by different people’ 
– thereby suggesting some kind of commonality of theme or focus for those 
texts. Foucault (1972: 8) argues for three conceptions of discourse and how it 
operates: ‘the general domain of all statements…[or] an individualizable group 
of statements…[or] a regulated practice that accounts for a number of 
statements’. A version of the second of these understandings – an 
individualized group of statements – will be adopted in this study. Given the 
space limitations here, a further narrowing of focus in the discourses to be 
considered will help to make the subsequent analysis more practical. Foucault 
(1991: 54) also offered criteria for such an individualization of discourses: ‘the 
linguistic system to which they belong, the identity of the subject which holds 
them together…the existence of a set of rules of formation for all its 
objects…all its operations… all its concepts…all its theoretical options’.  
The limitations imposed by the use of a Foucauldian approach in this paper 
are acknowledged from the outset. Specifically, the extent to which the 
identity of the drone operator can be conceived through the mode of the 
subject. For Benhabib (1992: 237), Foucault’s approach leaves him with ‘thin’ 
conceptions of the self. Even if Benhabib’s observation is accurate, a thin but 
well-founded conception of drone operator identity still provides greater 
insight than either an inaccurate conception or no conception at all. Further, 
Foucault’s (1997c: 290) subject ‘is not a substance. It is a form’ and is 
necessarily partial and contingent. That form is not consistent or ever-present 
within even the same individual.  
Foucault (1997c: 290) gives an example of individuals having a different 
relationship to the self ‘when you constitute yourself as a political subject,’ and 
when ‘you are seeking to fulfil your desires in a sexual relationship’. However, 
this disjuncture has benefits when applied to the example of the drone 
operators because, on a daily basis, they must form themselves as one kind of 
subject in their practices in a domain of war, watching and killing distant 
enemies. Then, at the end of each shift they travel – within minutes – into a 
domain of peace where they form themselves as subjects again, this time in 
their non-work-related practices as a family member or friend. For example, 
picking up children from school, cooking dinner, shopping at the 
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supermarket, or going to the cinema. In contrast to the self-formed ethical 
subjectivity of the drone operator in this historically unique mode of 
conducting warfare – distant yet intimate – is the view from the outside; 
representation in discourse in which the drone operator is conceptually 
present yet physically invisible behind secure fences and guarded barriers. 
Foucault thereby offers a conception of ethical subjectivity that can be used to 
analyse the emergence of the subject in multiple ethical modes, from the 
desiring subject – the focus of his own analysis (1984a: 5) – to the subject of 
social concern or the subject of war (Lee 2010). Furthermore, Foucault’s 
ethical subject emerges in two ontologically distinct but entwined trajectories: 
first, in relation to socially or culturally accepted rules, prohibitions and 
interdictions, which he calls the ‘moral code’ (1984a: 25); and second, through 
‘ethical problematizations based on practices of the self’ (1984a: 5). The 
ethical subject is expected to conform to the former while also creatively 
engaging with the latter through a number of technologies of the self.  
The internet is a democratizing force in access to, and dissemination of, 
discourse of any type, and drone discourse is no different. Further, individual 
bloggers or clicktivists can attract greater viewing traffic than conventional 
electronic document archives like the UN’s by having more efficient links to 
search engines and incorporating effective search criteria. Therefore, 
contrasting drone discourses will be examined as discussion turns now to 
other-representation of the drone operator, usually the pilot, as (un)ethical. 
First, a UN document and related newspaper article will be considered, 
followed by analysis of discourse from blog sites that are openly available on 
the internet but which appear not to have the same degree of editorial control 
as the preceding UN/newspaper examples. This approach will be contrasted in 
the subsequent section, which will explore how identity is created in the self-
representation of the drone operator. 
3.  Other-Representation of ‘the Drone Operator’ 
In 2010 Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or 
arbitrary executions, submitted a report to the UN Human Rights Council in 
which he outlined a number of background, legal and operational concerns as 
they related to targeted killing (2010). He specifically criticised the American 
use of drones both within and beyond recognised areas of armed conflict 
(Alston 2010: 7ff.), and at both government policy level and individual 
operator level. In his submission Alston cautions that ‘because operators are 
based thousands of miles away from the battlefield, and undertake operations 
entirely through computer screens and remote audiofeed, there is a risk of 
developing a ‘Playstation’ mentality to killing’ (2010: 25). With no existing 
military capability that closely resembled the technical, physical or emotional 
conduct of drone operations, Alston provides what Kahneman (2011: 
98)would identify as a ‘heuristic alternative’: that is, substituting an easier or 
more straightforward idea or question as a method of solving more difficult 
problems or dealing with more difficult ideas (Kahneman 2011: 98; 2003: 
1469). Alston substitutes a known or simple heuristic – what happens when 
people play computer games – with a difficult or unknown heuristic – what 
happens when people kill by remote control over vast distances. The locus of 
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this substitution would appear to be the computer screen, via which the 
images of war – or images of the artificial world of the game – are mediated.  
Alston had to make a series of necessary assumptions in order to even propose 
that killing by drone can be equated to game playing. First and most 
important, that the drone operators are unable to sustain a mental distinction 
between images of real live human beings on a screen, and the computer 
generated images used in fictional games. Second, that there are therefore no 
physical, moral or emotional responses to actual killing, only the responses 
that a game would prompt. And third, the mental trauma that some US drone 
pilots have reported (Daborn 2016: 815ff.), and which this author has 
encountered in the course of his interviews with British drone operators (Lee 
2017), must come from some other source, since mere game-playing is 
unlikely to produce such drastic effects. 
Alston demonstrates one further kind of psychological manoeuvre as he 
articulates elements of his official UN report in a newspaper article: namely, 
‘anchoring’ (Kahneman 2011: 119ff.). In an article for the UK’s Guardian 
newspaper entitled, ‘A killer above the law?’ Alston, co-authored with Shamsi, 
argued that ‘Britain’s use of drones in the war in Afghanistan must be in 
accordance with international law’ (2010a). While the article is ostensibly 
about the UK’s use of drones in Afghanistan, Alston and Shamsi ‘anchor’ their 
comments on British drone use in the activities of the CIA’s ‘secret drone 
killing programme’ in the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in 
the previously mentioned, ‘‘PlayStation mentality’’ that they say surrounds 
drone killings (Alston 2010). In the newspaper article, Alston and Shamsi 
(2010a) explicitly link video game-playing military personnel, physical 
remoteness, joysticks, and the killing of ‘real people’. In addition, such killing 
is referred to as ‘antiseptic’, as though there are no impacts on the person 
pulling the trigger to fire a missile on a distant enemy. 
Alston and Shamsi also refer to a surge in CIA drone killings, questioning their 
legitimacy and positing that they might just be retaliatory on the part of the 
CIA by their operators. The next discursive device deployed in the article 
brings the focus back to the UK and calls for the British Ministry of Defence to 
establish accountability mechanisms to ensure that British drone operators 
function in accordance with international law. Despite the UK’s air force being 
a military organisation – in contrast to the CIA being a civilian organisation – 
and despite the lack of evidence that UK drone operators are operating in, say, 
Pakistan like the CIA (Pakistan being outside the UK’s recognised theatre of 
military operations), the anchoring effect prompts the reader to judge the 
UK’s drone operators’ activities in relation to the operationally, 
organisationally, politically and legally unrelated CIA. Interestingly, the 
United States Air Force and its use of drones is not criticised in Alston’s 
(2010) UN report in the same way that the CIA is criticised. 
Kahneman (2011: 119) describes the ‘anchoring effect’ as occurring when 
‘people consider a value for an unknown quantity before estimating that 
quantity’, adjudging the outcomes of the relevant experiments as ‘among the 
most reliable and robust results of experimental psychology’. There is not the 
scope in this paper for an exhaustive explication of the phenomenon. 
However, it can be observed at work here as Alston and Shamsi (2010a) use a 
newspaper article to represent the drone operator as a particular kind of 
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subject of political violence. The result is that the reader of their article who 
knows little or nothing about lethal drones and the variations in drone use 
between different states and different military organisations, will make her or 
his judgement about British drone operators based on the subjectivity of the – 
unrelated – CIA operators that has been provided. In Kahneman’s terms 
(2011), before estimating the unknown ‘quantity’ of British drone operators’ 
legal-ethical practices, the reader will be influenced to assume that they are 
closer to the CIA’s (illegitimate) approach than they otherwise would if the 
CIA’s practices had never been mentioned.  
For Foucault (1984a: 28-9), ‘in certain moralities the main emphasis is placed 
on [conforming to] the code’, and instances can be seen in both examples of 
Alston’s discourse discussed here: his official UN Human Rights report, and 
the newspaper article that draws upon that report. In the former Alston (2010: 
7) introduces a ‘secret targeted killing programme…reportedly conducted by 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)’ in Pakistan. Civilian operators are also 
reported to strike targets approved by ‘senior government personnel’ (2010: 
8). In addition, in the recognised NATO battlefield of Afghanistan, the US 
military operators conduct unrestricted attacks on the Taliban and the ‘drug 
lords’ that fund them (2010: 8). In terms of the codified morality to which the 
CIA, the US military and their respective operators conform, the US 
Department of State specifies both the right to self-defence and International 
Humanitarian Law. However, apart from identifying these elements of a 
moral code that provides the framework within which US drone operators – 
civilian and military – conduct operations, no further detail about how the 
code is operationalized is offered. Ultimately, Alston’s report (2010: 8) 
suggests ways of enhancing such a code: specifying who can legitimately be 
targeted and killed; introducing procedural safeguards; create ‘accountability 
mechanisms’.  
In summary at this point, Alston’s UN report and his newspaper article on 
that report, constitutes drone operators in two ways. First, as obligated to the 
code – International Humanitarian Law – that shapes their conduct and, 
second, as game players, physically and emotionally distant from their targets, 
and removed from consequences of their actions. British drone operators are 
constituted in relation to the latter, without evidential support – only by 
discursive manoeuvre.  
Moving away from Alston – but retaining the CIA emphasis – his ‘Playstation 
killer’ meme is reproduced as the drone pilot is again constituted as distant, 
irresponsible and unethical (Cole et al. 2010). Elsewhere, and going much 
further in constituting drone operators as unethical is blog-based polemic: 
He is a drone ‘pilot’. He and his kind have redefined the words ‘coward’, 
‘terrorist’, and ‘sociopath’. He is the new face of American warfare. He is a 
government trained and equipped serial killer. But unlike Ted Bundy or John 
Gacy, he does not have to worry about getting caught. It is his job…They 
PURPOSELY wait until they can kill dozens of children too… [these] child 
killers known as the CIA (Pittman 2013). 
The drone ‘pilot’ here is the symbolically representative figure that 
incorporates the sensor operator (the person who fires and controls the 
missiles) and the mission intelligence coordinator (the person who ensures 
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that the correctly identified target, which could be a person, is struck). There 
is no attempt at a measured analysis of the complexities of delivering lethal 
force. Unlike Alston (2010) who examines drone operators and operations 
through the lens of codified morality in the form of international 
humanitarian law (IHL), Pittman (2013) eschews such code-oriented 
interpretation and constitutes the drone pilot as unethical in relation to 
subjective attitudes and specific actions. The subjectivity of the drone ‘pilot’ is 
formed as ‘coward’, ‘terrorist’, ‘sociopath’, and ‘serial killer’ in the conduct of 
CIA drone operations. In Foucauldian terms, the individuals lack any ‘ethical 
substance’; that is, the part of the individual and the individual’s behaviour 
‘which is concerned with moral conduct’ (1997b: 263). In Foucault’s schema, 
ethical substance underpins the subject’s attitudes and behaviours. Such 
linkages between (un)ethical substance and (un)ethical action can be seen in 
Pittman’s drone discourse (2013: [online]): drone pilots carry out a 
‘terrorism/ assassination program’ and ‘senseless act[s] of violence and 
murder’ because of existing character traits and behaviours like ‘sociopath’ 
and ‘serial killer’. 
Further claims about drones and those who operate them are made elsewhere 
with greater recourse to social scientific evidence: 
Social science research shows that drones are a gateway to moral 
disengagement, dehumanization, and deindividuation. The great distances 
drones operate over, manipulated by faceless-nameless-lawyeristic-voyeurs, 
creates an emotional, mental, and physical divide between ‘us’ (i.e. our 
government) and the enemies we kill. Drones allow us to dissociate our actions 
from our values, a useful high-cost and high-tech justification (Wilson 2011). 
Wilson cites the research of psychologist Albert Bandura (2004), who 
proposes several mechanisms by which drone operators morally disengage 
from their targets. However, Wilson assumes that the proposed theoretical 
explanations for drone operator conduct can be applied unproblematically. He 
fails to distinguish between social science research that offers a theoretical 
basis for possible actions by drone operators, and social science research that 
engages empirically with the operators themselves. Bandura’s (2017: 41-43) 
presentation of moral disengagement by drone pilots includes the use of 
euphemistic language to, in some way, avoid the reality of their actions, 
‘absolv[ing] themselves of ‘collateral damage’ by drone strikes through 
displacement and diffusion of responsibility’, and viewing enemies as 
‘subhuman beings or dangerously deranged’. Bandura focuses on the US and 
the CIA’s use of drones, again with the implication that his theorizing applies 
universally across all drone operators – a factor that will be revisited in the 
next section. 
The applicability of purely theoretical approaches being applied to the 
experience of all drone operators has been questioned elsewhere (Lee 2013a; 
Lee 2013b; Lee 2015; Lee 2017). Further complexity arises when the disparate 
drone-related activities of the CIA, United States Air Force, Israeli Air Force 
and the UK’s Royal Air Force are conflated, intentionally or otherwise, as in 
the Alston discourse. This conflation occurs despite different political 
contexts, legal frameworks and ROE which, in turn, shape the application of 
lethal force by those states. In other words, there are variations across military 
organisations when it comes to their authorizations and willingness to kill 
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civilians in the course of their operations. The secrecy surrounding these 
differences contributes to a discursive environment where facts and informed 
insight is lacking.  
A rare exception to this secrecy, and a contrast to the other-representation 
illustrated above in the Alson and Shamsi (2010a) Guardian newspaper 
article, occurred in May 2017 when the UK Ministry of Defence released 
details of an RAF Reaper drone missile strike against Islamic State in Abu 
Kamal, eastern Syria. A Hellfire missile was used to kill a rooftop sentry and 
disrupted a public execution that Islamic State was about to carry out 
(MacAskill 2017). The way this secrecy exception was reported raises the issue 
of ‘footing’ – the discursive positioning of the speaker (Goffman 1979, 1981, 
cited by Potter 1996: 142ff). The title of the article – ‘RAF drone strike 
disrupted public killing staged by Isis, says MoD’ – immediately identifies the 
MoD as the origin, or ‘principal’ (Potter 1996: 143) of the story, the ‘principal’ 
being the individual or organisation whose position or view is being 
represented. In contrast, the Guardian newspaper takes the position of the 
‘animator’ (Potter 1996: 143); that is, it says but does not ‘own’ the words or 
allow the words to be seen as indicative of its editorial position. The 
newspaper reproduced the MoD statement without commentary or opinion. 
The lack of representation, and the mere reproduction of the statement, 
distanced the journalist and newspaper from what the MoD presented as a 
‘good news about drones’ story. The approach also enabled the Guardian to 
maintain its footing in opposition to drones. I will return to this incident in 
the next section.  
Multiple problematizations of the drone operator have already been identified 
in the way that (s)he is constituted as (un)ethical in both popular and 
academic discourses: coward, terrorist, sociopath, serial killer, de-humanized, 
remote, detached, Playstation killer. As a result, the emerging subjectivity of 
the drone operator, especially the ethical subjectivity, is partial and 
externalised, constituted in discourse that has not included – because of 
official constraints – the words of active, operational drone crews. Such 
discourse, to use Jabri’s term (1996: 7), ‘delegitimates’ their use. 
4.  Drone Operator as Self-Constituting Subject 
The focus of the present study/paper now shifts to primary research data I 
have gathered from RAF Reaper drone operators, which is used to explore 
how (s)he ‘constitute[s] himself [and herself] as a moral subject of his [or her] 
own actions’ (Foucault 1984: 352). This shift will reveal the self-
representation at work as drone operators form their own identities in relation 
to their practices. This self-representation is framed here in terms of 
Foucault’s practices of the self as drone operators form their identities in 
relation to ethical conduct. Foucault (1984a: 28) wrote of the practices of the 
self through which subjectivity is constituted in discourse:  
There is no specific moral action that does not refer to a unified moral conduct; 
no moral conduct that does not call for the forming of oneself as an ethical 
subject; and no forming of the ethical subject without ‘modes of subjectivation’ 
and an ‘ascetics’ or ‘practices of the self’ that supports them. 
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Within this conceptual framework, this section draws on examples from 
extensive field research based on 80 interviews, and 40,000 words of written 
feedback from 25 drone operators over two studies.2 The purpose is to gain an 
insight into how RAF Reaper drone operators form their identities, exploring 
modes of self-subjectivation and practices of the self at work in their 
discourses. This analysis will explore some of the means by which drone 
pilots, sensor operators and mission intelligence coordinators (the three 
members of a full crew) in the two Royal Air Force Reaper squadrons were 
able to form themselves as ethical subjects as they have conducted 
surveillance, reconnaissance and lethal strike operations over Afghanistan, 
Iraq and Syria. 
Foucault (1984a: 28) allowed that actions which simply conformed to rules or 
laws could contribute to an individual seeing themselves – and being seen by 
others – as ‘moral’, but considered it to be insufficient. He considered the 
creative self-forming aspect of ethical subjectivity to be crucial. In 1983, the 
year before he wrote The Use of Pleasure, Foucault (1997b: 263-5) proposed 
four aspects of these practices, or technologies, of the self:  
[First] the part of myself or my behavior which is concerned with moral 
conduct…[second] the mode of subjectivication, that is, the way in which people 
are invited or incited to recognize their moral obligations…[third] the means by 
which we can change ourselves in order to become ethical subjects…[fourth] 
the kind of being to which we aspire when we behave in a moral way. 
Foucault was neither prescriptive nor rigid in setting out how the relationship 
to oneself emerges, and the way that emergence is framed in these criteria. For 
example, the part of the self that is ‘concerned with moral conduct’ – is not 
fixed: neither over time and cultures, nor between different individuals 
(1997b: 263). He identified ‘desire’ as a key factor for early Christians, 
‘intention’ as the primary Kantian ethical substance, with ‘feelings’ more 
important as a motivator in the present (1997b: 263). Similar variation exists 
in the means by which individuals are encouraged to recognise their moral 
obligations – his ‘mode of subjectivation’ – and, correspondingly, to change 
their behaviour as a work of the self, on the self: all in pursuit of ends that can 
range from the religious to the humanitarian or philosophical. 
As RAF Reaper drone operators discursively form themselves as ethical 
subjects below, they consistently recognize the importance of conforming to 
codes throughout. Crucially, however, the emergence of ethical subjectivity 
alongside conformity to codes will occur in response to the following 
questions – adaptations of Foucault’s aspects of the self above – concerning 
ethical motivations, means, intentions and teleological aims.  
1. What is the basis of an individual’s ethical conduct? 
2.  How do individuals come to recognise their moral obligations?  
3. In what behaviour do individuals see themselves as acting ethically 
during combat operations?  
4. To what do individuals aspire when they behave in a moral way?  
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4.1 What Is the Basis of an Individual’s Ethical Conduct 
Consistent with the Foucauldian framework adopted here, several 
respondents identified a difference between conforming to codes – for 
example, IHL (Geneva Conventions) – and a broader morality that includes a 
subjective ethics element in the conduct of lethal operations. In the discussion 
to follow, to ease identification of the sources used in the analysis, written 
responses from respondents from 39 Squadron in Nevada are identified by 
letter (e.g. Respondent A), while written responses from XIII Squadron in 
Lincolnshire are identified by number (e.g. Respondent 3). Where first names 
are used, these are pseudonyms and the quotations are drawn from interviews 
with the author between July 2016 and June 2017.   
Respondent 11 observes: ‘Ethics do shape our decisions alongside LOAC [Law 
of Armed Conflict] and ROE’, while Respondent 12 refers to ‘the internally 
generated desire to do the right thing’, acknowledging that this is probably 
somehow rooted in his Roman Catholic upbringing. Separately, Respondent B 
gives a more nuanced and elaborate response that differentiates morality from 
rule-following: 
[D]uring a weapon employment, ethics are at the very forefront of one’s 
thinking. It is one thing to simply follow the rules – LOAC, UK ROE, etc. – just 
because they are the rules. It is quite another to look at the morality of what one 
is doing and answer the personal question ‘is what I am doing morally 
justified?’ 
An example of the basis of ethical conduct articulated by Reaper operators is 
will to duty: a desire to undertake actions that are expected of them and which 
others – notably ‘friendly’ soldiers or civilians on the ground – rely upon for 
their safety or survival. Over more than two years of research engagement 
with 39 (Reaper) Squadron and XIII (Reaper) Squadron it became apparent 
that the concept of duty is highly ingrained (common among military 
personnel more widely). Equally engrained is a strong reluctance to attract 
personal attention to this commitment for duty: it is taken for granted. This 
attitude is rooted in RAF pilot culture that has been reconstituted and 
reinforced over generations. In the RAF Reaper Force overt public emotional 
responses to extreme events – even killing – are rare. Instead, an ethos of 
deliberate calm pragmatism is fostered.   
This is the background context for Respondents 8’s statement: ‘It does not 
affect me that sometimes our actions result in the death of enemy forces, I am 
simply there as a crew member to complete a mission’. ‘Completing the 
mission’ here is synonymous with fulfilling one’s duty, and ethical conduct is 
an element of that duty. Respondent 8 goes on to make this connection 
explicitly: ‘Throughout my participation as a member of a Reaper [crew] my 
only ethical considerations are that we operate within the law, which we have 
in every instance.’ In this statement, emphasis is on rigid conformity to code-
oriented morality – ‘operating within the law’. The personalised basis for 
operating within the law – a desire to do one’s duty – is implied but, 
consistent with behaviours and attitudes across both squadrons, usually 
unstated or understated.  
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Noting the relationship between law and personal ethics in Reaper drone 
operations, and their significance for his work, Respondent A states: ‘If my 
ethics do not match with [the laws I operate under] then my ethics take a back 
seat’. This prioritisation of conforming to codes – obeying the different laws 
that apply during lethal strike operations – is consistent across the Reaper 
Force and all of the operators: ‘The training system for UK RPA [Remotely 
Piloted Aircraft] continually reinforces the need to understand the ROE and 
LOAC [Law of Armed Conflict] in minute detail’ (Respondent F); ‘given the 
seriousness of the event, the emphasis on correct application of the ROE is 
always paramount when considering weapons employment’ (Respondent C).  
However, this conformity to codified morality (for example, ROE) does not 
happen in either conceptual or practical isolation. Alternative bases for ethical 
conduct that have been articulated include ‘defending my country’ (Angie) and 
‘Want[ing] to give something back [after serving on the ground in Afghanistan 
and seeing Afghans trying to break away from the grip of the Taliban]; looking 
after the guys’ (Ross). For Pat, Reaper is ‘as front line as you can get without 
being ‘out there’’, while Alison – who had passed the upper age limit to train 
as regular aircrew – was ‘craving something new’ and wanted to make a 
positive difference.3 Regardless of the reasons for individuals joining the 
Reaper Force and the many and varied reasons given as the basis for ethical 
conduct, the second question based on the Foucauldian framework asks:  
4.2 How Do Individuals Come to Recognise Their Moral 
Obligations? 
Foucault’s (1997b: 264) original formulation of this question refers to 
individuals being ‘invited or incited to recognize their moral obligations’. For 
the drone operators these invitations or incitements can be broadly divided 
into two groupings – those that are intrinsic to the Reaper community and 
those that are extrinsic. The former are, or have become, part of on-going 
praxis of the squadrons, with the latter coming in multiple formats from 
media coverage to anti-drone campaigning. 
Respondent A states that ‘The training of anyone in the military but especially 
at 39 Sqn [squadron] involves daily training on the rules of engagement and 
the law of armed conflict. Nothing we do can fall out of these boundaries.’ The 
training described here is not of the type historically associated with military 
personnel, complete with heavy backpacks, assault courses and physical 
endurance as the body is trained for the extreme challenges found in war 
(though a degree of physical fitness is still required). Neither is it a simple 
reminding of the drone crews about what the rules and laws state. Rather, the 
training of the drone operators at 39 Squadron comprises a work on the self 
that is externally encouraged, monitored and enforced. However, this work 
(on the self) involves a form of internalisation of external rules that can be 
understood as integral to the development of character. The need for such 
personal development is rooted in the complex military operations conducted 
by the Reaper drone personnel: watching for extended periods and killing as 
necessary.  
The pursuit of correct or virtuous living has been a focus of philosophers from 
the earliest times and that pursuit has consistently involved some form of self-
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training that goes beyond the physical. Foucault cites both Plato’s and 
Xenophon’s insistence on training, ‘askēsis’, to develop virtuous character 
through exercise of the soul, without which one cannot ‘do what one ought to 
do nor avoid what one ought not to do’ (Xenophon cited in Foucault 1984a: 
72). It would not be reasonable to conclude that the training of drone crews 
involves some direct expression of Platonic philosophy or a replication of 
Xenophon’s historical recollections. However, the classic Greek texts cited by 
Foucault highlight the ongoing relevance and complexity of character 
development, in a way that suggests some continuity with the self-formation 
of identity through drone practices.  
Even when individuals are actively developing their skills and their characters 
– in the Foucauldian sense – rigid conformity to codes is paramount, and is a 
response to two factors. First, every time a missile is fired or bomb dropped it 
is subject to scrutiny at various levels within the RAF operational and 
disciplinary structure. And second, the full motion video feeds are observed in 
real time in multiple headquarters in the UK and overseas. If laws are broken 
it is likely that dozens or even up to a hundred or more witnesses will have 
seen it – including military lawyers. So while Respondent A also emphasises a 
training of the self, Ken offers another perspective, stating that while 
conducting Reaper operations you ‘can’t hide things’4 from a wider audience 
because so many people in different command centres around the world can 
be watching the video feed from his Reaper. Further, in interview he 
acknowledged that he spent a lot of time thinking about the audience rather 
than just mentally shutting them out and focusing on the task. This approach 
is reinforced by Respondent C who states, ‘[There] is the external scrutiny that 
our actions are subjected to, both by other members of the squadron and the 
wider military who have access to our video feeds, as well as the ‘CNN effect’ 
that has permeated modern warfare’.  
Duty and well-intentioned altruism may well be primary motivators for some 
individuals when it comes to recognising their moral obligations; in addition 
there is also the panopticon disciplining effect of simply being watched all of 
the time. While the Reaper can be used to observe distant enemies for hours 
or days, the drone operator is continually subject to ‘an inspecting gaze’ 
(Foucault 1980: 155), for years on end. When I have asked sensor (weapons) 
operators about their immediate reactions after a missile strike, the general 
response is ‘relief’ that they did not mess it up.  
4.3 In What Behaviour Do Individuals See Themselves as Acting 
During Combat Operations? 
While there is a relationship between conforming to codes and the different 
aspects of ethical self-subjectivation, they also have a ‘certain kind of 
independence’ (Foucault 1997b: 265). Having emphasised the priority that 
drone operators give to conforming to codes, a further creative, self-forming 
aspect of drone operator identity emerges in response to this third question to 
come from Foucault’s technologies of the self. Respondent F elaborates on the 
relationship between ethical action and written codes, prioritising the former 
over the latter, with prevention of civilian casualties being crucial for the RAF 
Reaper crew members: 
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The highest priority during any engagement is to prevent civcas [civilian 
casualties]/collateral damage. This responsibility is at the forefront of our mind 
before striking a target, followed closely by the compliance with ROE and 
LOAC. I am very much of the mindset that I would allow an insurgent, however 
important a target, to get away rather than take a risky shot that might have 
collateral impact. 
In this approach, Respondent F’s priority varies from Respondent A’s – which 
was set out above and places conformity to law (codes) categorically above any 
personal ethic. In practical terms this contradictory prioritisation of personal 
ethics and obeying the law will not make a difference in how a missile or bomb 
strike is carried out, although the individual motivations for doing so might 
vary. The same mandated procedures will be followed before the weapon is 
fired and the same procedures will be followed afterwards: Battle Damage 
Assessment, which examines the immediate outcome of the strike, followed 
later by a debrief by a weapons debrief officer who will examine the whole 
process in minute detail through close analysis of the recorded video. 
However, there is a clear difference in the way in which the individuals form 
their identity as ethical subjects. Respondent J describes some of the thought 
processes that reveal a practical ethical dimension: 
Ethical considerations are a large part of the pre-strike assessments. Where can 
we strike a target? Will this strike, by hitting a valuable piece of equipment the 
person/target is on/in/near affect a village’s ability to harvest/work? Is the 
person close to his family compound, thereby meaning the first people to find 
the body, post-strike, are his own family? These are some of the questions I’ve 
been asked and asked of myself prior to the decision to strike a target. 
Consideration of the wider communal and family impact of a lethal drone 
strike increases the humanization of prospective targets rather than 
dehumanizes them. The crews regularly reflect on the indirect impact of their 
actions as well as the direct consequences – especially where the taking of life 
is concerned. Respondent J’s insight challenges one of the common popular 
discourses about drone operators, as represented by the Wall and Monahan 
(2011: 246) comment that ‘Drone systems necessarily objectify, and most 
likely dehumanize, people targeted by them’. The claim is repeatedly rejected 
by operators across the Reaper Force, typified by Respondent 6’s comment 
that, as the Mission Intelligence Coordinator in the crew, ‘My role, beyond 
assisting identifying the target in an engagement, is to ensure no civilians 
become casualties’. After several years’ experience, Respondent H is more 
resigned to being represented in popular discourse as unethical, saying, ‘I 
guess we just have to live with the bad press and accusations that we kill 
civilians with the knowledge that what we actually do is employ weapons more 
safely than any other aircraft’. Such an attitude points to a kind of discursive 
stalemate: the individual – Respondent H – identifies with the legitimacy of 
his actions, while rejecting the criticism that is found in other-representation 
of drone operators as unethical. 
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4.4 To What Do Individuals Aspire When They Behave in a Moral 
Way? 
The final consideration is the telos that the drone operators pursue while self-
forming as ethical subjects. While there are as many variations as there are 
personnel involved, one strongly recurrent theme in the Reaper drone 
operators’ discourse is the desire to construct themselves as having an 
ultimate aim in their actions: to act as a guardian. Respondent B articulates 
this ultimate aim and locates his morality in opposition to acts that he 
constitutes as unethical: 
I believe that it is my personal morality, what I will accept or not, that decides 
how I will react to a given situation… I don’t care what language you speak or 
what god you believe in (or not) or the colour of your skin. I do care that if you 
believe it is acceptable to poison the water supply in a girls school just because 
they are female, or it is justifiable to shoot a young girl in the face just because 
she wants an education, or you think that cutting the nose and ears off a young 
woman who tried to run away from a brutal husband is the correct form of 
punishment then you are my enemy and I will do whatever it takes to prevent 
you and others like you from being able to do it again!  
Others articulate the protector dimension more explicitly: ‘it’s our 
responsibility to help protect [the people on the ground]’ (Respondent I); ‘I do 
not take life easily but am secure that in killing an insurgent I am potentially 
ensuring that another ISAF or ANSF5 soldier gets to go home to their family’ 
(Respondent F). The last comment here makes a comparative calculation of 
the relative morality of the insurgent and the soldier. In this way, the 
protector/ guardian meme emerges strongly in squadron culture within the 
Reaper Force, and in different behaviours.  
The protection of individuals on the ground in an area of drone operations has 
both passive and active dimensions. Passively, the intelligence, surveillance 
and reconnaissance capabilities of the Reaper are brought to bear on the 
emergence of potential threats: direct attacks from enemy forces or indirect 
attack through the emplacing of improvised explosive devices. The latter poses 
as much risk to local civilian non-combatants – children and adults – as to 
ISAF or Afghan Army personnel. In addition, activities like beheadings or 
executions can be observed – and mental trauma experienced – as part of 
evidence gathering and the perpetrators followed afterwards as part of 
building up a wider understanding of individual and group activities. Actively, 
lethal force can be brought to bear against enemy fighters, unless proximity 
and therefore risk to civilians prohibits the use of weapons.  
As mentioned earlier, a recent high profile example was introduced above 
when a Reaper crew disrupted a public execution by Islamic State in Syria in 
May 2017 (MacAskill 2017). On 21 May, a few days after the strike, I 
interviewed the pilot – Gav – who fired the missile. He confirmed the outline 
details released by the MOD and used in newspaper articles. On a routine 
reconnaissance mission he and his crew had spotted a gathering crowd ‘being 
controlled by armed men at the intersection of two roads’. They recognised the 
hallmarks of a potential Islamic State public execution just before the 
prisoners were brought out of a vehicle. Gav described, ‘I was going from 
being [mentally] ‘stretched’ towards ‘panic’ because [I wanted to save the 
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prisoners but] I could not see the solution’. A missile that hit near or in the 
crowd would cause multiple civilian fatalities. ‘As soon as the ‘sharpshooter 
[on the roof]’ solution was suggested [by a colleague] I relaxed immediately’. 
In his desire to save the about-to-be-executed prisoners while not harming 
civilians, the telos of protector/guardian dominates this drone pilot’s thinking 
and shapes his identity in his practice.  
5.  Conclusion 
This brief engagement with the discursive landscape surrounding lethal drone 
strikes and some of the operators who carry them out has identified an 
important subjective dimension that is overlooked in public, political and 
scholarly drone debates. This dimension is commonly obscured by a lack of 
governmental and military transparency, which in turn is prompted by a 
desire to maintain operational secrecy, security and effectiveness. The 
identities, especially the ethical subjectivity, of the individuals who carry out 
lethal RAF Reaper drone missile and bomb strikes emerge in subtle and 
creative ways that are rooted in individual and collective practice. The other-
representation of drone operators and lethal drone strikes in public discourse 
as illegitimate is based primarily on applications and interpretations of 
international law and international human rights law – the codes spoken 
about above. However, the latter approach does not recognise or acknowledge 
the subtle, complex and creative ethical dynamics at work in the individuals 
who are routinely tasked with taking action that has life or death 
consequences. This oversight is partly a result of the conflation of three 
questions: Why are drones used? How are they used? Who is using them? As 
these questions come to be interrogated in more nuanced and insightful ways, 
policy makers, operators, members of the public and anti-drone groups will all 
gain a greater understanding of the issues involved. They can also work 
towards a future where broader understandings of drones – their benefits and 
their limitations – can be achieved through increased engagement with those 
who operate them. 
Notes 
1  Rules of Engagement (ROE) are specific instructions given to military personnel during 
operations to ensure that the use of lethal force conforms to Law of Armed Conflict and the 
Geneva Conventions, for example. They will specify when weapons may, and may not, be 
legally deployed and under what circumstances. ROE will cover eventualities such as self-
defence or defence of allied forces; when offensive action can be taken, or not; who is a 
legitimate target, or not. 
2 ‘Royal Air Force Reaper: 21st Century Air Warfare from the Operators’ Perspective’, 
University of Portsmouth Research Ethics Committee Protocol E365, approved 21 October 
2015, Ministry of Defence Research Ethics Committee Protocol 707/MODREC/15, 
approved 1 July 2016; ‘Exploring the roles of personal ethics, individual identity and 
operational practices in the formation of a collective ethos in RAF Reaper squadrons’,  
Ministry of Defence Research Ethics Committee Protocol 423/MODREC/13, approved 22 
December 2013. 
3    Personal interviews with author, 2017. 
4    Interview with author, 2017. 
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5    ISAF: International Security Assistance Force; ANSF: Afghan National Security Forces. 
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